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Abstract
This paper proposes a single-parameter characterization of the
consumption technology for a congested piiblic good where exclusion is
possible and consumption levels may differ. The entire range of con-
gestion possibilities (private to pure public goods) may be represented
by varying the technological paranieter. Analysis of optimal provision
of congested, excludable public goods using the proposed framework sug-
gests that public consumption levels should vary in the population to
reflect demand differences. Uniform provision, ^Aich occurs with many
public services, is generally suboptimal.

Congested, Excludable Public Goods: An
Analytical Framework.
by
Jan K. Brueckner
1. Introduction
Recognition of public good congestion has become widespread in
the recent public finance literature. Congestion implies that a fixed
amount of resources devoted to public production will generate less
public consumption per capita the larger the size of the consuming
group. The most common formalization of the congestion phenomenon
assumes that per capita public consumption z is related to public
output Q and group size n according to the expression z = Qn ,
where the parameter y satisfies <_y <_1. In this formulation,
the strength of congestion is inversely related to the degree of
jointness-in-consumption which characterizes the good. When y is
set equal to zero, the above expression gives z = Q, which represents
the case of a Samuelsonian (1954) pure public good where jointness-in-
consumption is perfect and congestion is absent (z is independent of
n) . Setting y = 1 yields z = Q/n, which corresponds to the case of a
publicly-produced private good where jointness-in-consumption is non-
existent (output is divided up among the consumers) and congestion is
substantial (a 1% increase in n reduces z by 1%). When < y < 1,
jointness-in-consumption is intermediate between the extremes of pure
public and private goods (output is neither divided up nor per-
fectly jointly consumed), and the strength of congestion is similarly
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moderate. This intermediate case is no doubt relevant for many
publicly-provided goods in the real world.
A crucial feature of the above formulation is the implicit con-
straint that public consumption levels are identical for all members
of the consuming group (z is the same for each of the n consumers).
While this constraint will be appropriate for a public good such as
national defense which has the property of nonexcludability , uniform
consumption is not a technical necessity for other goods such as
police and fire protection or education, where the possibility of
exclusion means that consumption levels may differ across individuals.
Clearly, the uniform-consumption constraint of the standard formula-
tion will illegitimately oversimplify the public sector resource al-
location problem when exclusion is possible. Indeed, since it will
be socially optimal in general for consumption of congested, excludable
goods to be non-uniform, efficiency analysis under a uniformity con-
straint necessarily carries a second-best interpretation.
The purpose of the present paper is to propose a specific frame-
work for the analysis of congested, excludable public goods. The
paper's principal innovation is the use of a one-parameter function
which captures the congestion phenomenon without constraining public
consumption levels to be uniform. The next section of the paper
introduces this function and discusses its properties. The third
section of the paper addresses the question of optimal provision of
congested, excludable public goods using the proposed framework. The
fourth section discusses conditions under which uniform provision of
a congested, excludable public good may be socially desirable even
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±n the presence of diverse tastes for public consumption. The final
section contains conclusions.
2 . The Analytical Framework
The issue of how public consumption is measured is important in
any discussion of congested public goods. When z = Qn , it is clear
that consumption and production are measured in the same units. In
the case of police protection, for example, Q would equal the size of
the police force while z would measure the number of police effectively
protecting each individual. While use of identical units is somewhat
unnatural (in the police case, response time might be a more appro-
priate measure of protection) , this approach is clearly necessary in
any fraiuework which attempts to include private and pure public goods
as limiting cases (units of measurement must be identical for such
2
goods). For this reason, the framework developed below also assumes
identical units of measurement.
The most general representation of a public consumption technology
where consumption levels may differ across individuals is a relation-
ship of the form
Q = f (z^, Z2, ... , z^), (1)
which gives the minimum production level Q needed to sustain a specified
public consumption vector in a group of size n. Since consumption need
not be uniform under (1), it is no longer possible to define congestion
in terms of the effect of an increase in group size n on the uniform
level of per capita consumption. Recalling, however, that the strength
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of Congestion is simply the mirror image of the degree of jointness-
in-consumption in the standard framework, it is natural to adopt a
jointness-in-consumption view of congestion in the present context.
Thus, the implied measure of congestion in the following discussion
will be the degree of jointness-in-consumption exhibited by the tech-
nology (1) (a synonym for congestion in the present framework is
consumption "rivalness")
.
The existence of jointness-in-consumption means that total
consumption of the publicly-provided good is greater than production.
In the standard formulation, jointness-in-consumption requires Q < nz,
1-Ywhich follows when y '^ J- (note th^at nz = Qn ). In the present con-
text, the existence of jointness-in-consumption means that (1) must satisfy
Q < ^z^. (2)
Inequality (2) will not hold, of course, in the case of a publicly-
produced private good. The absence of jointness-in-consumption for such
a good means that production and total consumption are identically equal,
so that (1) must reduce to Q = Iz.. On the other hand, when (1) repre-
sents an excludable pure public good, jointness-in-consumption is poten-
tially perfect but consumption levels nevertheless may differ. In this
case, (2) can be replaced by the more precise statement
Q = max {z.} (3)
since output clearly must equal the largest consumption level in the group.
It is important to realize that although (3) is predicated on non-
uniform public consumption, it will never be socially optimal for
z < Q to hold for any j when the public good is pure (consumption
may be increased costlessly for such an individual j). Specification
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of the consumption technology, however, must recognize the feasibility
of non-uniform consumption even when such a pattern may not be optimal.
A one-parameter function with the general form of (1) which has
the desired properties is
Q = (E2^®)^^^ e ^1. (4)
When 6=1, (4) reduces to the private good expression Q = Zz . . When
9 > 1 and z. > for at least two values of i, the jointness-in-
consumption property Q < Tz, follows from the standard inequality
T.Z. < (Ez.) . Finally, it is easy to see that
lim (Zz.®)-"-^® = max {z }, (5)
6-xx. ^
so that as 9 approaches infinity, the relationship (4) approaches (3),
the one appropriate for a pure public good. The proof of (5) consists
of rewriting the LHS of (4) as
z [Z(z./z )^]-^^^, (6)max 1 max
where z = max {z
, } , and noting that (z,/z ) ^0 for z. ^ zmax i ' ^ i max i max
as 9 -» <", so that the bracketed expression converges to unity when
z is unique (to an integer between 1 and n otherwise) while its
max -1 V 6
exponent converges to zero. Thus, the specification (4) has all the
features appropriate to a consumption technology for a congested,
excludable public good, with the type of good portrayed changing from
a private to pure public good (and congestion decreasing correspondingly)
as 6 increases from one to infinity. Finally, when the z. are
9 1 / Q
constrained to be equal, (4) reduces to Q = (nz ) or
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z = Qix-^/^ (7)
This relationship is identical to the standard formulation since 1/9
4
will range between one and zero as 8 increases from one to infinity.
Figure 1 shows graphs of "iso-output" contours (loci of z.
such that (Iz. ) = Q) for the case n = 2. The straight line
contour corresponds to the private good case, the quarter-circle
contour represents the intermediate case 9=2, and the right-angled
contour represents the pure public good case.
To understand the intuitive meaning of the specification (4) , it
is helpful to consider a concrete example. Suppose the public good in
question is police protection, with Q measuring as before the size of
the police force. The z. again represent the numbers of police ef-
fectively protecting individual houses (against burglary, say).
Since i's neighborhood may be patrolled more frequently than j's, z
need not equal z
.
; in this sense, exclusion is feasible. The
public good is obviously congested since Increasing the frequency of
patrol in any neighborhood requires more police, other things equal
(in other words, the pure public good case does not apply). However,
the protection technology is characterized by jointness-in-consumption
since the total number of police Q is less than the sum of the ef-
fective numbers of police protecting the various houses (a patrol car
protects many houses simultaneously by its presence in a neighborhood)
.
Note that if burglars are deterred by a relatively infrequent patrol,
6 will be large, indicating substantial jointness-in-consumption;
bolder burglars would lead to a lower 6 and a situation closer to
the private good case.
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3. Optimal Provision of a Congested, Excludable Public Good
The analysis of optimality will proceed under the assumption that
individuals consume a single private good (x.) in addition to the public
good. Letting U.(x ,z.) denote the utility function for individual
i and X. denote i's welfare weight in a linear social welfare function,
the Lagrangean expression for the welfare maximization problem is
ZA.U.Cx^.z^) - i|;F(Ex^,(Ez^®)^''®), (8)
where F = characterizes the production possibility curve for the
economy. The optimality conditions are
\2 !2^
^kl
"
^1 '\
k = 1, 2, .... n. (9)
When 6=1, the term multiplying F_/F^ becomes unity and (9) reduces
to the familiar set of optimality conditions for private goods:
MRS, = MRT must hold for all individuals k. When 9 > 1, however, it
1 -1
is easy to see that (z, /Iz. ) < 1, so that MRS, < MRT holds for
all k. The existence of jointness-in-consumption makes it suboptimal
for individual MRS's to fully mirror the trade-off between private
and public production.
In the case of a pure public good (6 = °=) , solution of the welfare
maximization problem is best accomplished in a two-step procedure which
does not make use of (9). First, since non-maximal z, values may be
-8-
increased up to max{z.} with no resource cost, the social optimum
clearly requires equality among the z.. Max{z.} then equals the com-
mon value z, which may be chosen optimally in standard fashion, yielding
the usual condition EMRS, = MRT (the relationship MRS. < MRT continues
to hold)
.
While SMRS. = MRT holds for a pure public good, EMRS will exceed
MRT when the public good is congested. In the private good case,
ZMRS. = nMRT, and it is easily shown that the relationship
nMRT >_ ZMRS . >_ MRT (10)
holds for arbitrairy 6^1, with the strict inequalities applying when
1 < 9 < "o. The validity of the first inequality in (10) is established
by summing both sides of (9) and noting that when
ft ft T
9 > 1, Z(z, /Sz.) 6 < n follows from the previously-noted fact thatktc . 11
each term in the summation is less than one. Satisfaction of the
second inequality in (10) requires that the above sum exceeds unity,
G—1 l/Tft— 1^ ft 1/ft
which is equivalent to the requirement (Ez. ) ' > (Ez.) . The
validity of the last inequality follows from the fact that (Ez.)
9
is a decreasing function of a. Eq. (10) shows that the familiar
EMRS. = MRT optimality rule is simply a limiting case in a general
congested public goods framework.
The feasibility of exclusion in the present framework means that
consumption levels may be high for high demanders of the public good
while resources may be saved by restricting the public consumption of
low demanders. By ruling out such skewed consumption patterns when the
public good is congested and excludable, welfare inaximization under
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the standard uniform-consumption approach leads to a suboptimal out-
come. To see how consumption is related to demand differences at the
optimum under the present framework, consider a simple example xAere
utility functions are U, (x.,z.) = x.+h.(z.), with h'. > 0, hV < 0.^ i i' 1 X X i ' X ' X
Suppose further that the ranking of the h. functions according to
the value of h'. is the same regardless of the magnitude of z, and let
individuals be numbered in ascending order of h' (hi < h'
^
, etc.).
Since h'. is simply the inverse demand function for the public good,
the ranking of consumers reflects the strength of their public good
demands. To see that high demanders enjoy higher public consumption
at the optimum, note that rearrangement of the condition (9) implies
that h'. (z.)z. = h'. (z.)z. for i t^ j . Suppose i > j, implying that
i is a higher demander than j, and suppose further that z. ^ Zj» Since
1
—ft 1 — fi
9 >_1, z.
—'^A holds, and since h'.(z) < h'.(z), it follows that
h! (z.) < h'. (z.) < h'. (z.), where the second inequality uses hV < 0.
1 — fl 1 —ft
Combining these results yields h'. (2.)z. > h'. (z,)2, , which con-* ^ XXX JJ3
tradicts the optimality condition and establishes the impossibility
of z, ^z.. Hence, public consumption is positively correlated with
the strength of demand under the given assumptions. Returning to the
police example of the previous section, this result translates into
the natural proposition that social welfare maximization requires
police protection to be skewed in favor of those citizens who, because
of frailty or some other vulnerability, are especially fearful of
burglary.
The analysis so far has assumed that the social planner knows
the utility function of each consumer in the economy. This, of course.
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is an unreasonable assumption, and its relaxation raises the familiar
problem of preference revelation. As long as the cost of public con-
sumption is correlated with the stated strength of a consumer's demand,
individuals may have an incentive to understate demand in pursuit of
a large surplus. For example, if the government were to pursue benefit
taxation, charging each consumer an individualized price per unit of
consumption equal to the RHS of (9) evaluated at the solution based on
stated preferences, high demanders may try to reduce their presumably
high price per unit by understating their preferences. It is
important to realize that the preference revelation problem need not
disappear when 6 becomes small. Since any degree of jointness-in-
consumption leads to different individualized prices for the public
good (see (9)), an incentive for strategic behavior to reduce the
cost of public consumption may exist even when 6 is small and the
consumption technology is close to that of a private good. In the
private good case, however, individualized prices will be identical
and equal to marginal production cost for the good, and since no
individual cost advantage can be achieved by misstatement of prefer-
ences, truthful revelation will occur.
4. Potential Optimality of Uniform Public Consumption
Real-world consumption levels are in fact uniform within juris-
dictional boundaries for many congested, excludable public goods
(examples are police and fire protection and public education) , an
outcome which would appear to be suboptimal given the preceding dis-
cussion. While the difficulty of ascertaining individual public good
demands (truthful or otherwise) may account for this institutional
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arrangement, a simple and realistic modification of the analysis sug-
gests that uniform public consumption may be socially optimal even
when true demands are known. The modification consists of recognizing
that a diversity of public consumption levels may entail an administra-
tive resource cost which would not arise under a simpler regime where
consumption is uniform. Letting S represent administrative cost in
terms of the private good, which equals zero when the z. are identical
but assumes a positive value c otherwise, the economy's production
constraint becomes F(Zx, - 6, (Zz. ) ) = 0. Clearly, an
allocation where consumption is uniform and 6=0 may be superior to
one where the z. differ and 6 = c. Thus, the standard representation
of a congested public good (z = Qn ) may be appropriate regardless of
whether or not exclusion is possible provided that the administrative
cost of sustaining consumption diversity is sufficiently high.
5. Conclusion
This paper has presented the first single-parameter characteriza-
tion of a consumption technology for a congested, excludable public
good. The framework permits relaxation of the uniform-consumption
constraint implicit in the standard congested public goods model
and allows individual public consumption levels to reflect demand
differences, leading to a higher level of social welfare. Since most
publicly-provided goods are excludable, normative analysis which
aspires to real-world relevance clearly must incorporate a framework
like the one presented in this paper.
/[ZA£
/ 2 2 1/2 -
max{z ,z }=Q
Figure 1.
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Footnotes
*I wish to thank Jon Sonstelie, Lanny Arvan, and Francoise
Schoumaker for comments. Any errors, however, are ny own.
Brueckner (1981) found that y for fire protection services is
approximately .25, indicating substantial jointness-in-consumption.
2
See Buchanan (1968) for a discussion of the problem of units of
measurement. Brueckner (1981) measured consumption and production in
different units in the case of fire protection.
3
The appropriateness of the formulation (4) was suggested by the
properties of the commonly-used social welfare function W = (EU ) ,
where a <_ 1. The Benthamite case W = EU . corresponds to a = 1, while
the Rawlsian case W = min{U.} corresponds to a = - °=. See Atkinson
(1970).
^
4
At this point, the existence of two other approaches to public
good congestion should be noted. Oakland (1972) assumes that an
individual's public consumption may equal any amount up to a capacity
level Q, with congestion entering the utility function via a term
equal to the ratio of the sum of individual consumption levels and Q
(this term has a negative partial derivative). Sandmo (1973) takes
the view that benefits from a public good are generated by joint con-
sumption with private goods. Congestion results from excessive use
of these private "inputs" (too many cars on a freeway, for example).
Stiglitz and Atkinson (1980), Ch. 16, present a diagram showing
the private and pure public good contours of Figure 1. They did not,
however, propose a way of handling intermediate cases.
The marginal conditions for the maximization of a linear social
welfare function also characterize a Pareto-ef ficient allocation.
If the marginal utility of public consumption falls to zero for
some individual i, there is, of course, no benefit from increasing z..
Since doing so is costless, however, as long as z . is non-maximal,
the conclusion in the text still holds.
g
In an example where it is possible to compute a closed-form
solution to the optimality conditions, the convergence of the solu-
tion to the pure public good outcome as 9 -> =° may be directly verified.
^i
The example assumes that utility functions are z, + x. and that the
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transformation function is Zx + (Ez ) = B, where B is some posi-
tive constant. The solution for public consumption levels gives
1
3-1
z^ = (X^/J^)
IK^^ ' ''
«- M^ '-''
where U = IZA. . As 9 -> ", the different z solutions converge
i i_ 1 •" ft
to B - Z(
^^
) i, which equals the z level satisfying IMRS, = MRT.
9
Straightforward calculations show that
i-1
f^(Ez.")l/^ = V^^"^" (^z^"[logz," - log(Zz «)]).
a j
which is less than zero.
The relationship (10) will, of course, hold when public consump-
tion is constrained to be uniform.
Recalling that in the preceding example, public consumption at
the optimum was positively correlated with the strength of demand, it
is clear from (9) that individualized prices will be similarly cor-
related with demand. Note that the individualized price which leads a
given consumer to demand his optimal z is a function of all the
optimal consumption levels, including his own.
12
An alternative formulation might assume a fixed administrative
cost plus a variable cost positively related to the variance of public
consumption.
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